The old commodity bargain is no longer enough. Much of the world is asking what Africa can supply: copper for grids, cobalt and graphite for batteries, minerals for data centres, energy systems and advanced manufacturing. But the more consequential question is what Africa can build.
In 2022–2024, more than half of the world’s economies still depended heavily on primary commodities, with the highest levels concentrated among vulnerable economies, including many in Africa.
Reliance on raw commodity exports exposes countries to price swings, external shocks and fiscal pressure. Natural wealth can generate export earnings without producing enough industrial transformation.
Processing, services, supplier industries, technology and skills can make economies more diverse and resilient. The central issue is not simply what countries extract, but how much value and capability they retain.
Investment is redrawing the production map
Investment, trade and production networks are being reorganised around AI-related digital infrastructure, semiconductors, critical minerals and energy-transition technologies.
Strategic sectors accounted for 44% of greenfield project values in 2025, up from 16% in 2020. They are shaping where future productive capacity is built and who captures value from the next generation of trade.
Africa is already central to this economy. Yet centrality in supply does not guarantee a central place in production.
If investment reinforces extraction without building local capabilities, the next production map will reproduce the old commodity model: resources in one place, production and value elsewhere.
Critical minerals can be a bridge, or a trap
Critical minerals are where the old commodity story and a new development opportunity meet. They underpin the technologies driving the energy and digital transitions.
Lithium demand alone is projected to grow by more than 350% between 2024 and 2040. But rising demand is not the same as development. What matters is where value is created, where it is retained and who builds the industries around it.
The Democratic Republic of the Congo accounted for 74% of global cobalt mine production in 2025. Refining and processing are even more concentrated. Much of the value is created after minerals leave the ground.
Without deliberate action, critical minerals could become the next commodity trap: mineral-rich countries supply the next industrial era while others process, manufacture, innovate and capture the larger gains.
Value addition is not simply a move from mining to processing. It also involves suppliers, services, skills, infrastructure and regional markets. Each country must identify where it can compete and progressively build capabilities.
Practical pathways are already visible
I saw this clearly in Madagascar during my recent visit. The country is a major producer of nickel, cobalt, graphite and ilmenite, yet much of the value generated from these resources is captured elsewhere.
UNCTAD’s work identified opportunities to connect mineral wealth to food processing, textiles, chemicals, plastics and supplier industries, with the potential to create formal jobs. Mineral production can support a broader productive base rather than remain an isolated export activity.
Earlier this year, UNCTAD presented similar assessments in Zambia and Namibia. The analysis identified 412 products in Zambia and 353 products across 23 sectors in Namibia and the potential creation of thousands of jobs in both countries.
These numbers turn a broad debate into a practical agenda: value addition can be mapped, costed, sequenced and connected to real firms, sectors and markets.
Africa must shape the next industrial era
Africa should not be treated as a passive supplier of raw materials for the energy transition, artificial intelligence infrastructure or advanced manufacturing elsewhere. If the world needs Africa’s minerals, partnerships must help build African industries.
This is not an argument for withdrawal from global trade. It is about the terms on which trade and investment contribute to development.
Investment should be judged by what it leaves behind: suppliers, skills, infrastructure, jobs, links with domestic and regional firms, and a clearer path from extraction to production. Value addition must also be treated as a regional and global agenda, because many African markets are too small to sustain complex industrial ecosystems alone.
Critical mineral partnerships must go beyond extraction agreements. They should support technology transfer, processing, manufacturing, standards, infrastructure and finance, or risk securing supply for others without changing the development trajectory of producer countries.
This has nothing to do with isolation or resource nationalism. It is about ensuring that trade and investment build productive capacity where resources are found. Commodity dependence is not destiny, but breaking it requires building that capacity at home.
The world clearly needs Africa’s minerals. The defining choice is whether that demand preserves the old geography of extraction or helps create a new geography of production, capabilities and retained value in Africa.
