The growing debate surrounding the relationship between the National Lottery Authority (NLA) and KGL Technology Limited should not be reduced to a question of whether KGL should or should not operate within Ghana’s lottery ecosystem.
This question has become particularly important following President John Dramani Mahama’s directive for a comprehensive review and possible renegotiation of the NLA–KGL agreement.
The directive requires examination of the contract’s legal basis, financial terms, revenue-sharing arrangements, fees, commissions, exclusivity provisions, liabilities, transparency, audit rights and other matters affecting the public interest. Where renegotiation is necessary, the stated objective is to secure improved fiscal returns to the State, strengthen governance and accountability, and protect the public interest.
The review process has since progressed. In April 2026, NLA Director-General Mohammed Abdul-Salam said the review committee had completed its work and that negotiations were continuing, particularly around improving the State’s share of the revenue.
This is an important opportunity.
But the review should not end with a better contract.
It should also lead to a better legal and financial structure.
The more important question is this:
Is the current legal and financial structure of the NLA–KGL arrangement the best structure for ensuring that the Ghanaian state receives the maximum possible economic benefit from the country’s lottery industry?
If the answer is no, then the conversation should move beyond personalities, political accusations and media controversy and focus on reforming the system.
One possible reform deserves serious consideration: amending the law to allow KGL, or any similarly structured private lottery partner, to make its statutory or contractual payments directly into the Consolidated Fund or into a dedicated National Lottery Fund administered under the authority of the Minister for Finance.
This would give government greater visibility over the revenue generated, strengthen fiscal accountability and ensure that the state’s share is determined through the appropriate public-finance framework.
THE CURRENT ARRANGEMENT DESERVES A SECOND LOOK
It is important to acknowledge the current management of the National Lottery Authority for reportedly transferring GHS10 million into the Consolidated Fund out of approximately GHS173 million paid by KGL to the Authority.
That development raises an important question.
If KGL paid substantial sums to the NLA, but only a comparatively small portion subsequently reached the Consolidated Fund, then the debate should not simply be about how much KGL paid.
The bigger question is:
How much of the money ultimately reaches the Ghanaian taxpayer?
This distinction is critical.
Money paid by KGL to the NLA is not necessarily the same as money received by the Government of Ghana. Between the two points, the NLA has operational, regulatory, administrative and other expenditure obligations.
The result is that a substantial payment made by a private-sector partner to a public institution may translate into a much smaller amount ultimately transferred to the Consolidated Fund.
This is precisely why the current structure deserves examination.
WHY SHOULD KGL PAY THE NLA FIRST?
The National Lottery Authority was established to regulate, supervise and manage national lottery activities.
Under the National Lotto Act, 2006 (Act 722), the NLA has significant operational, regulatory, supervisory and management responsibilities.
Section 2(2) establishes the Authority as the institution responsible for conducting National Lotto, while Section 35(1) provides for the Authority’s regulatory, supervisory and management functions.
Section 4(1) also provides that a person other than the Authority shall not operate any form of lottery.
These provisions establish the NLA as a central institution within the lottery ecosystem.
However, regulating an industry and managing public revenue are not necessarily the same function.
This is where Ghana may need to rethink the architecture.
If KGL’s contractual obligations generate substantial revenue for the state, why should the money first pass through an institution that must subsequently meet its own operational and administrative expenditure before transferring a portion to the Consolidated Fund?
A more straightforward structure could be considered:
THE PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW SHOULD PRODUCE BOTH A BETTER DEAL AND A BETTER SYSTEM
This is where the current review becomes particularly important.
The government, NLA and KGL now have an opportunity to reach a sustainable arrangement that recognises the legitimate interests of all three sides.
Once the commercial outcome is agreed, the law should be amended where necessary to give that outcome proper legal effect.
If the renegotiated agreement establishes a new revenue-sharing structure, the legislation should support it.
If the State’s share is to flow directly to the Consolidated Fund, the law should provide a clear legal basis for it.
If the NLA’s role changes, the legislation should reflect that.
Otherwise, Ghana could end up with a new contract operating under an old legal structure.
That would be reform in form, but not necessarily reform in substance.
A PROPOSAL THAT DESERVES SERIOUS CONSIDERATION
Interestingly, the proposal for a new revenue structure is not simply an argument being made from outside the review process.
I am reliably informed that the concept of restructuring the payment mechanism so that the State receives its agreed share more directly was among the proposals put forward by KGL during the review discussions involving the Ministry of Finance and the Attorney-General.
If this is ultimately confirmed and incorporated into the outcome of the negotiations, it would be significant.
It would mean that the discussion is not simply about increasing the amount KGL pays. It is also about changing the mechanism through which the State receives and accounts for its share.
That distinction matters.
The objective should not be to create a structure that simply moves more money into the NLA while leaving the same institutional revenue-flow challenges in place.
The opportunity is to design a system in which the State’s share is clearly identified, transparently accounted for and paid into the appropriate public-finance system, while the NLA receives the resources it requires to perform its statutory functions.
This would also provide an important basis for a possible consensus among the three principal interests involved:
Government gets a clearer and potentially stronger fiscal return.
The NLA receives predictable funding to perform its mandate.
KGL retains a commercially sustainable role and receives a fair return on its investment.
That is precisely why the proposal deserves serious consideration as part of the final outcome of the review.
But for such an arrangement to be sustainable, the law must be amended to reflect the agreed structure.
If the parties agree during the review that the State’s share should flow directly into the Consolidated Fund or another legally established public fund, the relevant provisions of the National Lotto Act and associated regulations should be amended accordingly.
Otherwise, the parties could agree to a fundamentally different commercial arrangement while remaining constrained by an old statutory revenue mechanism.
The review therefore presents an opportunity not merely to renegotiate the NLA–KGL contract, but to align the contract, the law and Ghana’s public-finance system.
This would separate revenue collection from expenditure management.
It would also give government a clearer picture of the actual economic contribution generated by the lottery partnership.
THE PROBLEM WITH THE CURRENT MODEL
The current arrangement potentially creates three different figures:
- What KGL pays;
- What the NLA retains and spends; and
- What ultimately reaches the Consolidated Fund.
For the ordinary Ghanaian, however, the third figure is arguably the most important.
The public is interested in how much revenue the state ultimately receives and what that revenue is used for.
If a company pays hundreds of millions of cedis to a public institution but only a fraction eventually reaches the central government account, there is a legitimate public-finance question that deserves an answer.
This does not necessarily mean that every cedi retained by the NLA is wasted.
The NLA has legitimate expenses. It has employees to pay, systems to operate, winnings to facilitate, regulatory functions to perform, technology infrastructure to maintain and other institutional obligations.
But that is precisely why government should determine, through the normal public-budget process, how much the NLA needs to perform those functions.
The fundamental question is whether the NLA should effectively serve as both a major revenue collection point and the institution determining how much of that revenue eventually reaches the central government.
WHAT HAPPENS TO THE MONEY BEFORE IT REACHES GOVERNMENT?
This is where greater transparency is required.
There have been public discussions about NLA expenditure in areas such as operational costs, the Good Causes Foundation, salaries, commissions, payment of winnings through Point-of-Sale terminals and debt servicing.
Rather than making unverified accusations, the appropriate response is simple:
Let the accounts speak.
Government, Parliament, civil society and the media should be able to establish clearly:
- How much KGL pays the NLA;
- How much the NLA retains;
- How much the NLA spends on administration;
- How much is paid in commissions;
- How much is spent on technology and technical services;
- How much is allocated to good causes;
- How much is paid into the Consolidated Fund; and
- What economic and social value is ultimately generated for Ghana.
If these figures are transparently published, much of the controversy surrounding the arrangement can be resolved through evidence rather than speculation.
THE BIGGER PROBLEM MAY ACTUALLY BE THE INFORMAL LOTTERY MARKET
There is another issue that deserves significantly greater public attention.
If claims that a substantial portion of Ghana’s lottery market is controlled by illegal or unregulated operators are accurate, then the country may be losing significant tax and regulatory revenue outside the formal system.
That should concern both the NLA and the Ghana Revenue Authority.
An operator that conducts lottery business outside the formal regulatory and tax framework potentially deprives the state of revenue while competing with businesses that operate within the law.
The question therefore should not only be:
“How much is KGL paying?”
It should also be:
“How much revenue is Ghana losing from the part of the lottery industry that is outside the formal regulatory and tax system?”
That is a much bigger public-interest question.
Government should undertake a comprehensive review of the entire lottery ecosystem, including illegal operators, taxation, licensing, commissions, technical-service contracts and the distribution of lottery revenues.
COMMISSIONS AND TECHNICAL-SERVICE COSTS ALSO DESERVE REVIEW
There have also been concerns about the level of commissions paid to Lotto Marketing Companies and technical-service providers.
If substantial percentages of gross revenue are paid as commissions or technical-service fees, government should determine whether those arrangements represent value for money.
This should not be treated as an attack on private companies.
Private-sector participation is necessary. Technology companies, payment providers, marketing companies and lottery operators can bring investment, innovation, infrastructure and expertise that government may not possess.
But every public-private arrangement must ultimately answer one question:
Is the state receiving fair value for the economic rights and opportunities being granted?
If the answer is yes, the figures should demonstrate it.
If the answer is no, the contracts and regulations should be reviewed.
KGL’S CONTRIBUTION SHOULD BE RECOGNISED – BUT SO SHOULD THE STATE’S INTEREST
The debate about KGL should also recognise the broader economic contribution associated with its operations.
KGL has demonstrated the capacity of an indigenous Ghanaian company to develop and operate technology platforms supporting large-scale commercial transactions. Its involvement in the digital lottery ecosystem has created investment, employment, technology and other economic opportunities.
That matters because Ghana needs more locally owned companies capable of moving beyond traditional businesses into technology-driven sectors and competing at scale.
However, recognising KGL’s contribution does not mean that the company should receive preferential treatment or that government should accept an inefficient financial arrangement.
The interests of the private sector and the public purse are not mutually exclusive.
The objective should be to create a framework in which:
KGL can operate profitably, the NLA can effectively perform its regulatory mandate, and the state receives a transparent and fair return.
If KGL has invested capital, developed technology and built operational capacity that the state currently benefits from, those investments should be recognised. At the same time, government must ensure that the economic value generated from the arrangement is distributed in a manner that serves the broader public interest.
This is why the debate should focus less on whether KGL should exist within the lottery ecosystem and more on whether the contractual and legal framework governing its relationship with the state delivers the best possible outcome for Ghana.
KGL pays the state’s agreed share directly into the Consolidated Fund or a dedicated National Lottery Fund.
The Ministry of Finance would then determine, through the appropriate budgetary process, the resources required by the NLA to perform its regulatory and operational responsibilities.
This would create a cleaner financial chain:
Lottery revenue – State account – Budget allocation – NLA operations
rather than:
Lottery partner – NLA – NLA expenditure – Balance transferred to state
The first model could provide greater fiscal discipline, transparency and parliamentary oversight.
WHY THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE SHOULD HAVE A CENTRAL ROLE
The Ministry of Finance has responsibility for the management and coordination of the country’s public finances.
Revenue belonging to the state should, as much as possible, be captured within the government’s central public-finance architecture.
This allows the government to make decisions based on national priorities.
If additional revenue becomes available, government can determine whether it should support healthcare, education, infrastructure, youth employment, social protection, debt management or other national priorities.
The NLA would then receive an appropriation sufficient to perform its statutory functions.
This is not about weakening the NLA.
It is about strengthening financial accountability.
THE NLA SHOULD FOCUS ON ITS CORE MANDATE
The National Lottery Authority has an important statutory mandate.
Its priority should be to:
- regulate the lottery industry;
- supervise licensed operators;
- protect consumers;
- prevent illegal lottery operations;
- ensure compliance;
- improve industry standards;
- ensure transparency in lottery operations; and
- maximise legitimate revenue available to the state.
The Authority should not necessarily be expected to operate as a quasi-treasury for large amounts of public revenue.
If the Ministry of Finance receives the state’s share directly, the NLA can focus on the functions for which it was established while receiving the resources necessary to execute them. That creates a clearer institutional division between revenue collection, regulation and expenditure.
CONCLUSION:
KGL should be allowed, where appropriate and subject to proper contractual and fiscal safeguards, to pay the state’s agreed share directly into the Consolidated Fund or an appropriately established National Lottery Fund.
The Ministry of Finance should then determine, through the proper budgetary process, the resources required by the NLA.
At the same time, the entire lottery ecosystem should be audited and reviewed — including illegal operators, commissions, technical-service arrangements, taxation, licensing and NLA expenditure.
This approach would neither be a favour to KGL nor an attack on the NLA.
It would be a reform designed to protect the public interest.
Ghana does not necessarily need less private-sector participation. Ghana needs better-structured private-sector participation.
The objective should be straightforward:
A commercially viable private-sector partner.
A properly funded and accountable regulator.
And a Ghanaian state that captures the maximum possible value for its citizens.
That is the conversation worth having.
