Abstract
Since the inception of Ghana’s Fourth Republic, the National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS) has operated as a pivotal national security agency. Despite the entrenched role of the NSCS in practice, neither the 1992 Constitution nor the Security and Intelligence Agencies Act, 2020 (Act 1030) provides an express legal basis for its existence, mandate or powers.
This paper argues that the continued operation of the NSCS constitutes a constitutional and statutory anomaly. It further contends that, in light of the 1992 Constitution’s explicit ban on the creation of any national security institutions aside from those expressly stated therein, the NSCS operates ultra vires and has progressively encroached upon the mandates of constitutionally and statutorily established security and intelligence agencies.
The paper concludes that unless the Constitution and relevant statutes are amended to expressly recognise and regulate the NSCS, its continued operation undermines the rule of law and accountability in the security governance framework of Ghana.
The Constitutional Architecture of National Security in Ghana
The 1992 Constitution of Ghana, per Article 83, establishes the National Security Council (NSC) and sets out its composition. For the avoidance of doubt, the Article provides that the Council shall be comprised of
a. The President
b. The Vice-President
c. The Ministers for Foreign Affairs, Defence, Interior, and Finance and such other Ministers as the President may determine
d. The Chief of Defence Staff and two other members of the Armed Forces
e. The Inspector-General of Police and two other members of the Police Service, one of whom shall be the Commissioner of Police responsible for the Criminal Investigations Department
f. The Director-General of the Prisons Service
g. The Director of External Intelligence (Research Department)
h. The Director of Internal Intelligence (National Intelligence Bureau)
i. The Director of Military Intelligence (Defence Intelligence)
j. The Commissioner of Customs, Exercise and Preventive Services; and
k. Three persons appointed by the President.
It is worth noting that the National Security Coordinator is not part of the National Security Council but has, by convention, been appointed to the Council as one of the “three persons appointed by the President”. However, under the current provision, if a President fails or refuses to invite the national security coordinator to a Council meeting, it would not constitute a constitutional breach.
Deductively, the current composition of the NSC reflects a deliberate constitutional design to ensure that all dimensions of national security, defence, intelligence, law enforcement, and internal security are comprehensively represented at the highest decision-making level.
Interestingly, the Constitution makes no reference whatsoever to a National Security Council Secretariat, and there is no express or implied provision authorising the creation of a permanent bureaucratic structure separate from, or superior to, the constitutionally recognised agencies.
More significantly, Article 85 of the 1992 Constitution provides that no agency, body, or institution other than those established under the Constitution (as represented on the Council) shall deal with matters of national security. This exclusivity clause is unequivocal and implies that the National Security Council Secretariat, an institution that purports to coordinate national security operations, is operating outside the remit of law.
In this context, the absence of the NSCS from the 1992 Constitution cannot be dismissed as a mere oversight. Rather, it must be understood as a deliberate choice by the framers to limit national security functions to clearly defined institutions. This conclusion may be a reason for the failure of the 2025 Constitutional Review Committee to add the Secretariat to the national security agencies listed in the 1992 Constitution in its proposal and the Committee’s decision to only expand the composition of the Council to include only the Director-General of the Immigration Service and the Narcotics Control Commission, and not the National Security Coordinator.
Statutory Silence: Act 526 and Act 1030
The statutory framework governing Ghana’s security sector compounds this constitutional silence. The Security and Intelligence Agencies Act, 1996 (Act 526), and its successor, the Security and Intelligence Agencies Act, 2020 (Act 1030), establish and regulate specific intelligence and security agencies, including their mandates, oversight mechanisms, and reporting lines.
For the avoidance of doubt, the security and intelligence agencies recognised by Act 1030 are the Regional and District Security Councils, set up as committees of the National Security Council; the Ministerial Security Co-ordinating Committee; and the National Intelligence Bureau and Research Department. Responsibilities and the Chairpersons or heads of each of the above committees or agencies have been expressly proscribed.
While Act 1030 recognises the portfolio of the National Security Coordinator, it does not establish a National Security Council Secretariat as an institution. There is no provision defining its structure, powers, staffing, or operational remit. For the avoidance of doubt, per section 21 of the 2020 Security and Intelligence Agencies Act (Act 1030), the Co-ordinator is to:
a. ensure the timely provision of effective logistics, skills and training in support of the national security requirements of the country;
b. co-ordinate, on a day-to-day basis, the operational activities of the intelligence agencies, and the regional and district security councils;
c. co-ordinate the implementation of national security strategies adopted by the Council, including the National Security Strategy, Counter-Terrorism Strategy and any other related action plans;
d. receive, collate and evaluate reports from the intelligence agencies and disseminate related information on a need-to-share basis within the Government and to other relevant stakeholders;
e. assist the relevant intelligence agencies to gather internal and external intelligence to prevent and detect threats to the security of the State;
f. oversee the integrity of the collection, reporting and assessment efforts and processes of the intelligence agencies to ensure that each operation has the necessary approval and is in compliance with existing enactments;
g. brief the Minister timeously of operational matters brought to the attention of the Co-ordinator;
h. be responsible to the Minister for the performance of the functions of the Co-ordinator; and
i. perform any other function related to the specified functions in this section as directed by the President or the Minister.
Deductively, there is no statutory authorisation for the Secretariat to conduct intelligence operations, undertake enforcement activities, or issue directives to other agencies.
The logical inference is that the legislature envisaged a limited administrative support arrangement for the National Security Coordinator, comprising a small number of officers, as per section 23 of Act 1030, who are either appointed, transferred, or seconded from other public institutions to assist with coordination and administrative functions.
What has emerged in practice, however, is a fully-fledged Secretariat with expansive authority, operational capabilities, and institutional permanence, none of which is grounded in the legal framework for national security agencies.
The Illegality and Superfluity of the NSCS
The continued existence and expansion of the NSCS raises two interrelated concerns: illegality and institutional redundancy.
First, given the Constitution’s explicit limitation on which bodies may deal with national security matters, the NSCS operates without legal authority. Its engagement in intelligence gathering, security operations, and inter-agency directives amounts to the exercise of public power without lawful sanction. This is fundamentally incompatible with the principle of legality, which lies at the heart of constitutional governance.
Second, the NSCS is functionally superfluous. The National Security Council already comprises all relevant agencies responsible for Ghana’s national security. These agencies possess constitutionally and statutorily defined mandates, operational capabilities, and accountability frameworks. There is therefore no lacuna that necessitates the creation of an additional, overarching institution.
Rather than filling a gap, the NSCS duplicates and, in some instances, supplants the functions of established agencies. This duplication not only undermines institutional clarity but also distorts command structures and weakens accountability.
The Case for Legal Reform
The persistence of the NSCS suggests that the State considers it operationally useful, if not indispensable. If that is the case, constitutionalism demands clarity.
There are only two legally coherent options available:
1. Abolition of the NSCS to align practice with existing constitutional and statutory provisions; or
2. Formal legal recognition through constitutional amendment and statutory reform, clearly defining the Secretariat’s mandate, limits, oversight mechanisms, and relationship with other security agencies.
Absent such reforms, the NSCS continues to arrogate to itself powers not sanctioned by law, thereby operating in defiance of constitutional supremacy and invariably fostering corruption and abuse of power.
If the second option is considered, the ideal constitutional provision should provide for the Secretariat and specify its mandate and leadership as has been provided for by the 1992 constitution for other state and intelligence agencies, such as the Ghana Armed Forces and the Ghana Police Service.
Such an ideal provision, in tandem with international best practices, may be as follows;
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL SECRETARIAT
Establishment and Purpose
There is hereby established a National Security Council Secretariat, which shall be responsible for the day-to-day administrative, technical, and coordination support of the National Security Council in the performance of its functions under this Constitution.
Functions of the Secretariat
The functions of the National Security Council Secretariat shall include—
a. providing administrative and logistical support to the National Security Council;
b. coordinating inter-agency consultations and information-sharing among institutions represented on the National Security Council, in accordance with law;
c. preparing briefs, policy papers, risk assessments, and strategic options for the consideration of the National Security Council and the President;
d. monitoring and facilitating the implementation of decisions of the National Security Council, without prejudice to the statutory mandates of the relevant agencies;
e. serving as the central repository for national security policy documents and records of the National Security Council;
f. supporting strategic planning, early warning, and national security policy coherence, subject to such safeguards as may be prescribed by law; and
g. performing such other administrative or advisory functions as the National Security Council or the President may direct, consistent with this Constitution and any Act of Parliament.
Limitation of Powers
The National Security Council Secretariat shall not—
a. conduct intelligence collection or analysis independently of the constitutionally or statutorily established security and intelligence agencies;
b. undertake security operations, arrests, detentions, or enforcement actions; or
c. issue directives to any security or intelligence agency except as authorised by law or pursuant to decisions of the National Security Council.
Head of the Secretariat
The National Security Council Secretariat shall be headed by the National Security Coordinator, who shall—
a. be appointed by the President in accordance with the 1992 Constitution;
b. be responsible for the efficient administration of the Secretariat; and
c. act as the principal coordinating and administrative officer for the National Security Council.
Staffing
The staff of the National Security Council Secretariat shall consist of public officers who may be appointed, recruited, transferred, or seconded from other public institutions in accordance with law.
Conclusion
The National Security Council Secretariat occupies a paradoxical position in Ghana’s security governance architecture: indispensable in practice, yet invisible in law. Neither the 1992 Constitution nor Act 1030 provides a legal basis for its existence, mandate, or authority. On a strict reading of the constitutional text, the NSCS is not merely irregular but unlawful.
In a constitutional democracy, national security cannot be insulated from the rule of law. Efficiency and expediency cannot substitute for constitutional authorisation. The National Security Council Secretariat cannot be shrouded in strategic ambiguity but grounded in explicit constitutional and statutory authority, lest the pursuit of security itself become a source of constitutional insecurity.
ABOUT THE WRITER
Akua Serwaa Ampong is a Ghanaian lawyer with over eight years of professional experience. She holds a Master’s degree in Diplomatic Studies from the University of Oxford and a Master of Arts in Peace, Security and Intelligence Management from the University of Professional Studies, Accra. Her work lies at the intersection of law, strategy, and policy, with a particular focus on security governance, intelligence accountability, and the legal dimensions of international cooperation.
